


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NSA review completed



## Communist Violations of the Vietnam and Laos Settlement Agreements and Related Developments

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16 January 1974

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16 January 1974

## Forty-Sixth Report

### COMMUNIST VIOLATIONS OF THE VIETNAM AND LAOS SETTLEMENT AGREEMENTS AND RELATED DEVELOPMENTS\*

(This report covers the week  
from 9 January through 15 January 1974)

#### The Key Points

- Troop infiltration last week continued at a high rate, as six regular groups comprising about 3,500 men destined for the B-3 Front and COSVN areas were detected in North Vietnam.
- Recent evidence suggests that travel times to the B-3 Front and COSVN areas for at least some regular infiltration groups have been considerably reduced.
- A new front headquarters has been formed in Thanh Hoa Province of North Vietnam, controlling at least three subordinate divisions.
- Communist logistic activity in southern North Vietnam and southern Laos was heavy during the week. Heavy traffic also continued on Route 9 in northern South Vietnam.
- The Communists continue efforts to collect and store rice in South Vietnam despite efforts of the GVN to limit such procurement.

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\* This report has been prepared jointly by the Central Intelligence Agency and the Department of Defense.

[Redacted]

### Preface

This report is the forty-sixth in a series summarizing evidence received during the reporting period of (1) Communist efforts to infiltrate new manpower and military supplies toward and into South Vietnam, (II) Communist-initiated combat activity in violation of the Vietnam and Laos settlement agreements, and (III) other developments affecting Communist military capabilities in Indochina.

## DETAILS

**I. Infiltration and Redeployments of North Vietnamese Personnel and Military Supplies***Personnel Infiltration*

1. Troop infiltration to South Vietnam continued apace last week, as six regular groups were detected in North Vietnam. Five of these groups, with nearly 3,000 troops, are destined for COSVN, while the sixth group, comprising about 600 troops, is moving toward the B-3 Front (see the table, below). As a result of the detection of several of the COSVN-bound groups, six additional undetected groups with at least 3,000 troops are believed to have started, or soon will start, toward this area. These groups are included in our estimate of infiltration starts.

2. Eight small special-purpose groups with about 225 people also were initially reported last week. One of these groups, composed of civilian administrators, is destined for southern Laos or adjacent border areas while the other seven are traveling toward MR Tri-Thien-Hue, the B-3 Front, and COSVN. Five of the eight special-purpose groups were noted at the top of the infiltration system in North Vietnam, while the other three were detected farther south.

3. Although troop infiltration to the B-3 Front and COSVN began slowly this dry season, detections of regular groups traveling to these areas have increased sharply during the past several weeks. Since late November, some 19,000 troops — slightly less than the rate projected by Rear Services Group 472 on 11 November — have been sent to the B-3 Front and COSVN. Although it still is early, this rate suggests that the projection was valid.

4. In addition to the higher input of troops to the B-3 Front and COSVN areas noted in recent weeks, the time required for at least some groups to reach these areas from North Vietnam has been substantially reduced compared with previous dry seasons. For example, one regular group moved from Vinh, North Vietnam, more than 500 miles to the vicinity of Kratie, Cambodia, in 12 days — a journey normally requiring 60 days. Both regular combat and special-purpose groups now could reach the B-3 Front in 20 days and COSVN in 30 days, if Hanoi continues to use vehicles to transport infiltrators. These travel times are about half the previous estimates, and they reflect not only the bomb-free environment of the last year but also the improved road network. As a result of these reduced travel times, the North Vietnamese are able to plan military activity in South Vietnam with considerably less lead time than previously.

**Comparative Starts of Troops  
from North Vietnam, by Destination  
1 September - 15 January**

	1972-73	1973-74
<b>Total</b>	<b>61,500</b>	<b>45,500</b>
MR Tri-Thien-Hue	18,500	2,000
MR 5	7,000	2,000
B-3 Front	11,000	5,500
COSVN	15,000	13,500
Southern Laos/MR 559	10,000	22,500

***Redeployments***

5. Major elements of the North Vietnamese 218th Antiaircraft Artillery (AAA) Regiment have moved from southern Laos into Quang Tri Province of South Vietnam, where they apparently have been operating since late November 1972 (see the order of battle map). At least three of the regiment's eight battalions have been identified in COMINT in the province; although the remaining five battalions are unlocated, they may still be in Laos, where they have been operating since deploying there from North Vietnam in January 1973. The move of the equivalent of another AAA regiment increases the number of such units in Quang Tri Province to 18 (plus one surface-to-air missile regiment), a total that may exceed Communist air defense requirements there. Some of these units, however, may have moved undetected, or may intend to move, farther south in MR 1 along Communist Route 14, where there have been recent indications of Communist plans to increase air defense coverage.

**Movement of Military Equipment and Supplies**

***North Vietnam***

6. Following a one-week lull, logistic activity in North Vietnam's Panhandle was brisk last week, as COMINT reflected daily southward shipments of ordnance and other supplies. Typical of this activity was an intercept from a storage area north of Vinh which indicated that it had received 250 37-mm AAA barrels and had dispatched nearly 100 tons of cargo, mostly ordnance, on 10 January. Also, a 12 January message from Binh Tram (BT) 8 at Vinh stated that it was preparing to pick up 660 tons of weapons and ammunition from a storage point in the Thanh Hoa area (see the transportation map). In other activity, BT 8 reported on 10 January that more than 400 tons of cargo, including 140 tons of 130-mm ammunition, would be sent to northern Laos during January.

## Communist and South Vietnamese Regular Combat Forces in South Vietnam

## South Vietnam

Regular Combat Forces		MR 1	
VC/NVA <sup>1</sup>	RVNAF <sup>2</sup>	VC/NVA	RVNAF
187,000	320,000	89,000	89,000
		325th	VNMC
		324B	Airborne
		304th	1st
		711th	2nd
		2nd	3rd
			Regional Forces

1. Includes VC/NVA personnel in ground combat, combat support, and air defense units and local force companies and platoons.

2. RVNAF Ground Order of Battle. Includes assigned personnel in ARVN/VNMC ground combat and combat support units, and Regional Force battalions. Although present for duty strength is no longer available, it is estimated to be about 85% of assigned strength.

## MR 2

VC/NVA	RVNAF
35,000	68,000
320th	23rd
10th	22nd
3rd	Regional Forces

## MR 3

## VC/NVA RVNAF

VC/NVA	RVNAF
38,000	75,000


429th Sapper Command	25th
9th	18th
7th	5th
5th	Regional Forces

## MR 4

## VC/NVA RVNAF

25,000	88,000
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1st	21st
	9th
	7th
	Regional Forces



7. Farther south, logistic units between Quang Khe and the DMZ also were busy last week. In the period 11-13 January, BT 26 elements shipped 600 tons of cargo, mostly ordnance, to units farther south by barge. On 13 January a unit involved in this activity reported that it had 475 tons of cargo remaining, 150 tons of which was foodstuffs.

### *Southern Laos*

8. A high level of logistic activity was also noted in Laos last week. Aerial reconnaissance [redacted] showed continued heavy movement of trucks down the Laotian dual-lane corridor from south of Tchepone southward some 160 miles to the tri-border crossing point into South Vietnam. The traffic flow pattern was largely southward, convoys of 50 to 110 trucks being observed on several days moving toward the tri-border. Communist truck traffic also continued to be heavy and mostly westbound on Route 9 from the Khe Sanh area into southern Laos, then southward on the dual-lane system.

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9. COMINT also confirmed the movement of several large convoys through the Laos Panhandle and provided some information on their destinations. For example, nearly 500 trucks were reported active on 9 January, and the following day 300 vehicles were detected moving through Laos en route for turnover to Communist forces in the B-3 Front (65 vehicles) and COSVN (235 vehicles) areas of South Vietnam. It was not reported whether the vehicles moving on 10 January carried supplies or for what purpose the vehicles would be used once they arrived at their destinations. Besides their military use, some of the trucks sent to the COSVN area may be used to gather rice and move it to central storage areas.


### *South Vietnam*

10. Besides the activity on Route 9 near Khe Sanh cited above, the only other significant occurrence in northern South Vietnam last week was a report that a 300-vehicle convoy would be carrying very heavy machinery from Dong Ha and Cam Lo on Route 9 to an unspecified destination. Although the type of equipment was unspecified, these deliveries may reflect Communist efforts to build light industrial facilities in this area.

## **II. Communist-Initiated Combat Activity in South Vietnam and Laos**

### *South Vietnam*

11. In South Vietnam the total number of Communist-initiated cease-fire violations reported by the South Vietnamese Armed Forces since 27 January 1973, since 15 June 1973, and for the past week (9-15 January 1974) are shown below:



Military Region	Total Since 27 January Cease-fire		Total Since 15 June Cease-fire		Last Week (9-15 Jan 74)	
	Major	Minor	Major	Minor	Major	Minor
Total	4,467	29,780	2,098	15,825	40 (66) <sup>1</sup>	425 (456) <sup>1</sup>
MR 1	1,555	5,708	530	2,349	1	29
MR 2	745	4,942	481	3,088	11	90
MR 3	693	5,187	291	2,611	13	46
MR 4	1,474	13,943	796	7,777	15	260

1. Figures in parentheses denote totals of the previous week.

12. Some of these violations may have been initiated by South Vietnamese forces rather than Communist forces, and it is impossible in all cases to determine the actual instigator. The tabulation above and the charts following the Annex, however, show fairly accurately the trend in the amount of combat that has occurred in South Vietnam since the cease-fire. The fact that a combat incident occurred at a particular time and place is generally reported accurately by the South Vietnamese even though the question of who started it may not always be treated objectively. Operational reports since 19 December, however, have attempted to distinguish between Communist and friendly-initiated violations. Only those violations designated as Communist-initiated are reported in the above tabulation.

### *Laos*

13. There was no significant military activity in Laos during the past week.

### **III. Other Developments Affecting Communist Military Capabilities in Indochina**

#### *New Major Headquarters Formed in Central North Vietnam*

14. Recent analysis of COMINT indicates that Hanoi has created a major new headquarters of "front" echelon in central North Vietnam. The headquarters, located in Thanh Hoa Province and active since early November 1973, has three subordinate infantry divisions - the 308th, 312th, and 320B - which were withdrawn from northern South Vietnam last year, as well as elements of the Artillery, Armor, and Engineer Commands.

15. The establishment of the new headquarters this far north in North Vietnam is unprecedented, and its exact purpose is not known. It may

be designed to consolidate command and control over Hanoi's strategic reserve forces within North Vietnam, but it also would facilitate a coordinated deployment outside of North Vietnam of a multi-division level force in the event Hanoi should decide to take such action in the future.

***Recent Photographic Reconnaissance over North Vietnam***

16. [redacted] mission over North Vietnam found no evidence of recent seaborne or rail imports of military equipment. The nearly cloud-free mission, however, provided good coverage of most major military installations, the rail system, and coastal transshipment areas.

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17. CIA interpretation of coverage of five known armor storage and training areas in the country showed 350 armored vehicles - tanks and armored personnel carriers (APCs) - parked in groups and scattered over the training facilities. These included 194 pieces of armor at Vinh Yen, 26 tanks at the Xuan Mai Training Area, and about 100 tanks and APCs in three storage parks in the Panhandle, 20 miles south of Thanh Hoa (near the Cong Phu rail siding). Another group of 27 canvas-covered tanks were seen south of Dong Hoi, parked in the same area and position as observed

[redacted] The DIA count of the same mission totals some 280 armored vehicles. The only major area of difference is at Vinh Yen, where DIA observed about 130 armored vehicles.

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18. More than 4,000 trucks and pieces of equipment were observed in the five major vehicle storage parks between the China border and Hanoi. Some 1,650 vehicles were in the Dong Dang parks, [redacted]

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19. Merchant shipping was normal in the Haiphong area, but higher than usual at several Panhandle transshipment points. Besides moderate to heavy transshipment activity at the Hon Nieu and Hon La anchorages and the ports of Quang Khe and Dong Hoi, the mission also showed two new transshipment points in active use. One of the new points is an anchorage off the small island of Hon Me south of Thanh Hoa opposite the Cong Phu area, the site of the recent storage of some 100 tanks and APCs. The petroleum barges and some 15 other logistic craft observed at Hon Me may be engaged in the development of a new permanent military facility.

***Communist Rice Situation in South Vietnam***

20. Highlighting the Communists' continuing concern with the rice situation in South Vietnam [redacted] COSVN last month issued another special directive emphasizing the importance of

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rice collection. Although worded more mildly than one distributed several months ago, the directive reminds both cadre and troops that "the Party's requirement remains the purchase and collection of as much rice as possible." In addition, it specifically urges them to overcome GVN measures to limit Communist procurement.

21. GVN officials in southern South Vietnam claim that these rice controls -- which include new restrictions on personal hoarding and on the transportation of rice and other goods into Communist-controlled areas -- have considerably reduced the amount of supplies available to the Communists and have created some food shortages.

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the government program is causing problems for the Communists in some areas, they also indicate that in other areas Communist trading and collection activities continue relatively unimpeded. In the coastal province of Kien Giang in MR 4, for example, the Communists reportedly estimate that, between early fall and the end of January, nearly 4,000 tons of rice will have been harvested in areas under their control. Together with substantial rice procurement in other delta provinces, this rice should enable the Communists to cope with their current food problems in southern South Vietnam.

22. The GVN has attempted to limit Communist access to rice in northern South Vietnam, but widespread flooding there in November has hindered Communist rice collection and storage much more than GVN controls have. The unusually severe storms in coastal MR 1 that coincided with the early harvest of the fall-winter rice crop will prevent the Communists there from obtaining as much rice as they had expected. For example, as of mid-December, flooding had reportedly destroyed 35% of the Communists' rice in storage and under cultivation in Quang Ngai Province, which is the source of much of the food collected by Communists in MR 1.

23. To combat the effects of flood losses, North Vietnam reportedly has begun to send rice to its forces -- usually self-sufficient in this respect -- in the MR 1 lowlands. Daily food rations have also been reduced, and additional money for rice purchases in government-controlled areas has been delivered. In northern MR 2, where rice stocks were also damaged by the heavy rains, the delivery of 5,000 tons of rice promised by the Khmer Communists to the B-3 Front, if implemented, should alleviate shortages and enable the Communists in both the highlands and coastal provinces to rebuild their stockpiles.

## ANNEX

INFILTRATION OF NORTH VIETNAMESE PERSONNEL  
TO THE SOUTH

1. Groups 2045, 2046, 2047, 2049, and 2055, en route to COSVN, and Group 3011, destined for the B-3 Front, were detected at Binh Tram (BT) 8 near Vinh, North Vietnam, last week. These groups have a total strength of about 3,500 troops. An estimated 3,000 men in Groups 2044, 2048, 2050, 2051, 2052, and 2053 also have been committed to infiltrate the COSVN area, although these groups have not yet been detected. Special-purpose Groups 204, C363, C450P, M221, M267, M347, and Y246 also were detected en route to MR Tri-Thien-Hue, COSVN, and the B-3 Front with about 200 personnel. Four of these groups were detected at BT 8, while the other three were noted in the Group 470 area. Group A565 with 25 specialists was observed at BT 8 starting toward the Laotian Panhandle or contiguous border areas.

2. Since the 15 June "second cease-fire," about 56,000 North Vietnamese have infiltrated southward, including some 51,000 combat troops and about 5,000 specialists. Since the 27 January Paris Agreement, some 106,000 personnel have infiltrated southward, including about 95,000 combat troops and some 11,000 specialists. About 81,000 have started south since 27 January, while 25,000 were in the pipeline moving southward as of that date. The following table shows the number of North Vietnamese infiltrators starting south, by month and destination, since 1 January 1973.

Number of Troops Entering the Pipeline Destined  
for South Vietnam, Southern Laos, and Cambodia  
Since 1 January 1973<sup>1</sup>


	COSVN	B-3 Front	MR 5	MR Tri-Thien-Hue	Southern Laos/ MR 559	Total
Total	26,500	11,000	9,000	14,000	26,500	87,000
1973						
Jan	7,000	5,000	4,000	2,500	...	18,500
Feb	5,000	500	...	1,500	1,000	8,000
Mar	...	...	...	1,000	...	1,000
Apr	1,000	...	...	...	...	1,000
May	...	...	...	7,000	...	7,000
Jun	...	...	...	...	1,500	1,500
Jul	...	...	3,000	...	...	3,000
Aug	...	...	...	...	1,500	1,500
Sep	...	...	2,000	2,000	3,000	7,000
Oct	...	...	...	...	14,000	14,000
Nov	1,000	1,000	...	...	5,500	7,500
Dec	3,500	1,000	...	...	...	4,500
1974						
Jan 1-15	9,000	3,500	...	...	...	12,500

1. Excludes special purpose personnel. The totals are rounded to the nearest 500.



# CEASE-FIRE VIOLATIONS IN SOUTH VIETNAM AS REPORTED BY RVNAF

(28 JANUARY THROUGH 31 JULY 1973)




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# CEASE-FIRE VIOLATIONS IN SOUTH VIETNAM AS REPORTED BY RVNAF

(1 AUGUST 1973 TO THE PRESENT)



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